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Wage-Rate Subsidies for Dislocated Workers
January 1995
An array of innovative policies has been suggested to address more effectively the
needs of dislocated workers. In this paper, we model and simulate the impacts of a wage-rate
subsidy (or salary supplement) program in which a dislocated worker who becomes reemployed
would receive a payment equal to one-half the difference between the wage previously earned
and the wage currently earned. The simulations are based on a search model that is
institutionally rich and that provides estimates of the impacts of a wage subsidy by
incorporating empirical results from the reemployment bonus experiments that were conducted
in the mid- to late-1980s. The model includes several groups of workers other than dislocated
workers and therefore provides estimates of the degree to which these other workers might
be crowded out of jobs by the wage subsidy program.
The results suggest that a wage-rate subsidy paid for two years after reemployment
would shorten the unemployment spells of dislocated workers by nearly 2 weeks, and would
increase employment of dislocated workers by about 900 to 1000 per 100,000 in the labor
force. But the simulations also raise the possibility that the gains for dislocated workers could
come at the expense of other groups of workers; that is, other groups of workers could
experience small increases in unemployment duration, and decreases in employment levels that
almost fully offset the gains for dislocated workers. Three factors may mitigate these
crowding-out results -- crowding out is widely dispersed over various groups of non-dislocated
workers, the structural changes that result in dislocation of some workers (and drive the need
for a policy like a wage subsidy) benefit non-dislocated workers, and the crowding-out results
are quite sensitive to one of our assumptions. We also compare the wage-rate subsidy
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Since the recession of the mid-1970s, there has been growing concern about dislocated
workers and interest in policies that might assist them. Dislocated workers are workers who
have lost a job as a result of a plant closing or mass layoff that resulted in turn from some
form of economic restructuring, such as technological change, changes in product demand,
or changing patterns of international trade. Such workers usually earned high wages and had
considerable seniority in their former job. Most had accumulated much firm- and occupation-
specific human capital. After dislocation, they face bleak prospects -- low-wage jobs, long
spells of unemployment, and difficulty gaining reemployment. As a result of dislocation, they
suffer large loses of human capital and lifetime income.'
The magnitude of the losses suffered by dislocated workers has been clarified recently
by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993a,b,c), who assembled a very large data base of
dislocated workers from administrative wage records. Their findings suggest that the average
dislocated worker suffers lifetime earnings losses totalling $80,000. Moreover, they find that
nearly three-quarters of the losses occur because earnings after reemployment are permanently
lower for these workers.
The losses suffered by dislocated workers pose a major challenge for public policy.
Existing policies to assist dislocated workers form a patchwork that does not come close to
compensating dislocated workers for their losses. (Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan 1993a,
chapter 7).2 Unemployment Insurance (UI) -- the largest and most important program providing
'The literature on dislocated workers has grown dramatically in the past decade. Hamermesh
(1989) and Seitchik (1991) discuss the difficulties in defining dislocated workers. Hamermesh
(1989) and Jacobson, lalonde, and Sullivan (1993a, chapter 2) review past evidence on the costs
of worker dislocation.
2These policies include income replacement from Unemployment Insurance (UI) and (for some)
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), job search assistance from the Employment Service, and
1
T-4
assistance to dislocated workers -- has served as an effective "first line of defense It against
the hardship suffered by workers experiencing short spells of unemployment or temporary
layoff. But UI has been criticized by some for providing benefits that are too stingy to
compensate dislocated workers for their losses and too brief to provided dislocated workers
the opportunity to complete education and training programs that would prepare them for good
jobs (U.S. Department of labor 1993; Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation
1994, chapters 1 and 2). Others have noted that UI creates especially strong disincentives
for dislocated workers to find reemployment, since they face low-wage jobs but usually receive
the maximum UI benefit amount (Jacobson, lalonde, and Sullivan 1993a, pp. 150-152).
An array of innovative policies has been suggested to address more effectively the
needs of dislocated workers. Some have been or are in the process of being implemented --
extended UI benefits are provided to certain workers enrolled in approved training under the
Trade Adjustment Assistance program, and intensive job search assistance is being
implemented through the UI system in the form of worker profiling. Others are under serious
consideration -- self-employment incentives and the reemployment bonus are included in the
Clinton Administration's Reemployment Act.
The wage-rate subsidy -- or salary supplement -- for dislocated workers is a promising
possibility that has received relatively little attention. 3 In this paper, we model a wage subsidy
program in which a dislocated worker who becomes reemployed would receive a payment
equal to one-half the difference between the wage previously earned and the wage currently
subsidized training programs (for example, Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment
Assistance, or EDWAA).
3Greenwood (1994) reports on the design of a wage-rate subsidy experiment that is underway
in Canada. Jacobson (1994) examines the impact of the wage-rate subsidy that is part of the




earned. 4 We model both a wage subsidy that is paid in perpetuity, and one that is limited to -
the 2 years following reemployment. This policy, which could also be thought of as a salary
supplement or earnings insurance, has been' suggested and discussed recently by several
researchers, including Jacobson, lalonde, and Sullivan, 1993a, pp. 160-169), Baily, Burtless,
and Litan (1993, pp. 194-197), and Parsons (1994).
The wage-rate subsidy we consider has much to commend it. It would induce
dislocated workers to search harder for jobs and accept employment that they might otherwise
refuse; hence, it would shorten their duration of unemployment and increase their employment.
It would redistribute income toward dislocated workers, who have suffered losses through no
fault of their own (and possibly through government action such as trade liberalization).
Private and social benefits would derive from the policy because output would increase,
workers' general skills would be maintained, and new skills would be acquired on-the-job. The
costs of a wage subsidy would be (at least partially) offset by reduced spending on public
income support and training programs, which would otherwise provide income and services
to the subsidized workers. Jacob~on, lalonde, and Sullivan point out that the wage subsidy,
by supplementing earnings after reemployment, attacks the source of nearly three-quarters of
the wage losses suffered by dislocated workers. They, and Baily, Burtless and Litan, stress
the reemployment incentive effects of the wage subsidy and its potential to reduce resistance
to structural change, such as trade liberalization. 5
4Jacobson, lalonde, and Sullivan (1993) specify a somewhat more complicated subsidy
formula. Baily, Burtless, and Litan (1993) would limit the subsidy payments to the two years
following dislocation, and would link the size of the subsidy to a worker's age and previous job
tenure.
5An alternative to the wage-rate subsidy is the wage-bill subsidy, which would pay a subsidy to
an employer who hires a dislocated worker. Existing evidence on wage-bill subsidies suggests that
they suffer from very low participation rates (see, for example, the evidence on the Employer Bonus
in Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987).
3
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But the benefits of a wage subsidy would not come without a potential cost. The direct
effect of the wage subsidy is to increase the search intensity of dislocated workers and
thereby increase their employment. But the increased search intensity of dislocated workers
also has an indirect crowding-out effect -- if dislocated workers search harder for jobs, then
dislocated workers may beat other (non-dislocated) workers to job vacancies. As a result, job
vacancies that would normally be. available to other workers are filled by dislocated workers,
and the other workers don't get jobs that they would otherwise obtain. This crowding-out
effect of a wage subsidy to dislocated workers, if large, could be an important drawback of
the policy. 6
Little is known about the potential effectiveness of a wage subsidy that is offered to
dislocated workers. 7 In this paper, we model and simulate both the direct and indirect impacts
of such a program. In the next section, we develop a search model that is institutionally rich
and that provides estimates of the impacts of a wage subsidy by incorporating empirical
results from the reemployment bonus experiments that were conducted in the mid- to late-
1980s. The model includes several groups of workers other than dislocated workers and
therefore provides estimates of the degree to which these other workers might be crowded
out by the wage subsidy program. The results, which are presented in section III, suggest that
the wage subsidy program would indeed provide gains to dislocated workers, but also raise
the possibility that these gains would come at the expense of other groups of workers.
6Effects of a similar nature have been considered by Levine (1993), who examined the spill-over
of UI on UI-ineligibles. Our earlier work considered the crowding-out effects of a reemployment
bonus on workers not offered a bonus (Davidson and Woodbury 1993).
7Jacobson (1994) appears to be the sole exception. In contrast, there is much evidence on the
effectiveness of the wage subsidy as an anti-poverty program targeted on disadvantaged workers.
See, among others, Bishop (1977), Hurd and Pencavel (1981), Betson and Bishop (1982), Lerman
(1982), and Haveman (1988, pp. pp. 165-168).
4
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Section III also compares the wage subsidy program with a reemployment bonus, and shows
that the two can be structured so as to give identical results. Although a reemployment bonus
would yield a given impact at lower cost than' a wage subsidy, bonuses have the disadvantage
that worker must act within 6 to 12 weeks of claiming UI benefits.
II. The Model
To investigate the impact of wage-rate subsidies on the reemployment of dislocated
workers, we use a partial equilibrium search model in the spirit of work by Diamond (1982),
Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1990). The model can be thought of as one in which
workers flow through various labor market states, with rates of transition between states
depending in part on the search behavior of workers. We assume that unemployed workers
search randomly across firms for a job vacancy, and that firms with vacancies randomly select
workers from the pool of applications they receive. Each unemployed worker chooses search
intensity -- the number of firms contacted -- in an effort to maximize expected lifetime utility.
Increasingsearch intensity raises the probability of reemployment but is also .costly. A steady-
state equilibrium is generated in such a model by equating the flows into and out of each labor
market state.
Worker dislocation is considered in the model by assuming that there are two
employment sectors -- high-wage and low-wage -- and that the economy experiences a one-
time shock that causes part of the high-wage sector to shut down. Dislocated workers in our
model are former employees of the high-wage sector who must now search for a low-wage
job. In contrast, high-wage workers who experience a regular layoff search for (and eventually




Since we are interested in the crowding-out effects of the wage subsidy program, it is
necessary to model the behavior of all unemployed workers, not just the dislocated workers
directly affected by the progr~m. Figure 1 summarizes the categories of unemployed workers
we examine in the model. We begin by dividing the unemployed into two classes --
unemployed workers who are eligible for UI benefits and those who are not. We refer to
workers in the latter class as "UI-ineligibles" and use Uj to denote the total number of such
workers in steady-state equilibrium. This class consists mainly of new entrants and reentrants
into the labor force, as well as workers with a weak attachment to the labor· force, and
typically accounts for approximately 60% of unemployed workers (Blank and Card 1991, table
1). We denote by q the fraction· of unemployed workers who are UI-ineligibles.
Next, we divide the class of UI-eligible workers into two sub-classes -- those who claim
UI and those who do not. W·e refer to workers in the latter subclass as "UI-eligible non-
claimants" and use Uk to denote the total number of such workers in the steady-state
equilibrium. Why these workers fail to claim benefits has concerned policy-makers and puzzled
researchers (Burtless and Saks 1984, Corson and Nicholson 1988, Vroman 1991, Blank and
Card 1991, Anderson and Meyer 1993). Among the various explanations for the failure of
these workers to collect benefits for which they are eligible, the most likely is that they expect
to find reemployment fairly rapidly. Hence, the costs of filing for and obtaining UI exceed the
expected benefits. We use k to denote the UI take-up rate -- that is, the fraction of
unemployed UI-eligible workers who choose to claim their benefits. Based on the work of
Blank and Card (1991), we set k = .75. 8
8Blank and Card report a range of roughly .65 to .75 for the UI take-up rate. The results
reported below are essentially invariant to changes in k in the range of .65 to .75.
6
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Finally, we divide the sub-class of UI-eligible claimants into three categories -- high-
wage, low-wage, and dislocated workers. The total number of high-wage UI-eligible claimants
in the tth period of search is represented by Uh,t while U"t and Ud,t play the same roles for low-
>wage and dislocated workers, respectively. In line with the discussion of dislocated workers
in the introduction, we define dislocated workers as workers who earned a wage premium in
their former job, but who can gain reemployment only in a low-wage job. 9 The wage premiums
earned before dislocation could result from collective bargaining agreements, firm-specific
human capital, a good job match, and/or efficiency wage considerations. We do not model the
source of the premium, but rather take it as given.
For our purposes, then, a dislocated worker is a victim of a shrinking high-wage sector
-- that is, a worker who earned a high wage in his previous job and, after separation, has no
alternative but (eventually) to accept a low-wage job. 10 In our model, the only difference
between low-wage and dislocated workers (once they are unemployed) is that the dislocated
workers receive wage subsidies from the government after they are reemployed, while low-
wage workers do not.. We use h to denote the fraction of UI-eligible claimants who earn high
wages, and d denotes the fraction of low wage workers who have been dislocated from the
high-wage sector.
91n the model (as in fact), only a fraction of high-wage workers who become unemployed are
dislocated -- namely, those whose unemployment stems from a plant closing or similar
restructuring. Most high-wage workers experience short spells of unemployment and are recalled
or find reemployment at a high wage.
lOin fact, dropping out of the labor force is another option for dislocated workers. However, the
model does not explicitly treat flows into and out of the labor force, which implies an assumption





Figure 2 depicts the model we use, which is based on a model we developed in earlier
work (Davidson and Woodbury 1993). The model characterizes flows through the labor
market by specifying stocks of workers in various states of employment and unemployment,
and then quantifying the transition rates between those states. We measure time in two-week
intervals (since UI claimants are typically certified for 2 weeks of benefits at a time) and
assume that all UI-eligibleclaimants exhaust their benefits after 27 weeks (Le., 14 periods) of
insured unemployment. 11 Essentially, the model follows workers as they flow through the
possible states of employment and unemployment, and uses steady-state conditions to
characterize an equilibrium.
There are two differences between the model used in our earlier work and the one used
here. First, in the earlier model, the UI take-up rate was assumed to equal 100%. In this
model, we relax that assumption and allow the UI take-up rate to be less than 100% (Le., k
< 1). Second, in the earlier model, workers and jobs were homogeneous. In this, model, we
allow for heterogeneity of jobs and workers by dividing UI-eligible claimants into high-wage,
low-wage, and dislocated workers.
The model consists of five sets of equations. The first set consists of three accounting
identities. We let T denote the total number of jobs available, use J to represent the total
number of jobs that are filled, and use V to represent the number of job vacancies in the
steady-state equilibrium. Since all jobs are either filled or vacant, the first identity is T = V +J.
"That is, we assume that UI-eligible claimants can receive 26 weeks of benefits after a waiting
week. We also assume that all UI recipients experience a single spell of unemployment during their
benefit year, and that they do not accept part-time employment that would result in partial benefit
payments. These assumptions fit the majority of UI recipients.
8
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The second identity states that all workers must be either employed or unemployed. If we let
L denote the total number of workers in the labor force and use U to represent total
unemployment, then our second identity is' L = J + U.
The third identity sums unemployed workers over the five categories shown in Figure
1 and over the time periods in which they are unemployed. If we use Uh,e to denote the
number of high-wage UI-eligible claimants who have exhausted their UI benefits (that is, have
been unemployed for more than 14 periods) and define Ul,e and Ud,e analogously for low-wage
and dislocated workers, then this identity can be written as U =Uj + Uk + Lt=l,14
(Uh,t + Ur,t + Ud,t) + Uh,e + Ur,e + Ud,e'
The second set of equations, the steady-state conditions, equate the flows into and out
of each state of employment or unemployment. If these equations are satisfied, then total
unemployment and its composition remain constant over time. Consider, for example, the flow
of workers out of employment and into UI-ineligible unemployment. We use s to denote the
separation rate, or fraction of jobs that turn-over in each period. Thus, sJ workers lose their
job in a given period. If we let q denote the fraction of unemployed workers who are UI-
ineligible (as noted above, we set q = .6), then qsJ UI-ineligible workers lose their jobS. 12 It
follows that the flow into state Uj is qsJ. To calculate the flow out of this state, let m j denote
the reemployment probability (or job match probability) for any UI-ineligible worker. Then mjUj
unemployed UI-ineligible workers find jobs in any given period, and this represents the flow out
of state Uj. These flows are shown in the northwest quadrant of Figur~ 2. In a steady-state
equilibrium, Uj must remain constant over time. Therefore, we must have qsJ = mjUj • There
is an analogous steady-state equation for each possible state of unemployment. Figure 2
12The remaining (1-q)sJ newly unemployed workers are UI-eligible.
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shows the flows into and out of each state and, for completeness, all of the steady-state
conditions are written out in the Appendix.
We refer to the third set of equations as the reemployment probability equations. They
define the probability of reemployment for any given unemployed worker as a function of the
search effort of all workers and the number of vacancies. 13 Let Pj.t denote the search effort
of an unemployed type j UI-eligible claimant in the tth period of search, where the subscript j
can take one of three values -- h for high-wage workers, ~ for low-wage workers, or d for
dislocated workers. The terms Pi and Pk refer to the search effort of unemployed UI-ineligible
and UI-eligible non-claimants, respectively. Search effort corresponds to the probability of
contacting a firm (alternatively, the number of firms contacted) in any given period by the
worker seeking employment. Assuming that workers apply to firms at random, the probability
that any given firm has a vacancy is VIT. If we let A denote the average number of job
applications received by each firm, then the probability that a worker gets a job conditional on
applying at a firm with a vacancy is (1-e-A)/A (see Davidson and Woodbury 1993). Thus, the
probability'that an unemployed type j UI-eligible claimant in the tth p~riod of search finds a job
is given by mj,t = Pj.t(VIT)(( 1-e-A)/A). As shown in equations (11 )-( 14) in the Appendix, there is
a reemployment probability equation for each state of unemployment (see also Figure 2).
As noted above, the probability of reemployment increases with search effort. But
increasing search effort is costly. We assume that the cost of search effort is given by cpz,
/
with z> 1 denoting the elasticity of search costs with respect to search effort. We assume
that c differs between UI-eligible and UI-ineligible workers, but that z is the same for all
workers.
13Note that in the reemployment probability equations in the Appendix [( 11 )-( 14)], each group's




Our fourth and fifth sets of equations are used to calculate the optimal search effort
of unemployed workers. In the fourth set, we calculate the expected lifetime income of
workers in each possible state of unemployme'nt and employment. Then, in the fifth set, we
calculate the level of search effort that maximizes these expected lifetime incomes.
Expected lifetime income is calculated by considering both the current and future
prospects faced by the worker. For example, let Vj,t denote the expected lifetime income of
an unemployed type j UI-eligible worker in ,the tth period of search, Vj,w the expected lifetime
income for an employed type j UI-eligible worker, w j the type j wage, and x biweekly UI
benefits. (As above, the subscript j can take on one of three values -- h for high-wage
workers, ~ for low wage workers, or d for dislocated workers). Then, an unemployed type j
UI-eligible claimant in the tth period of search receives current net income equal to UI benefits
less the cost of search, or x-c(Pj,t)z. With probability mj,t this worker finds a job yielding net
future income of Vj,w' With the remaining probability, 1-mj,tr the worker remains unemployed
and can expect net future income of Vj,t+1' Therefore,
Vj,t = x - c(Pj,t)Z + [mj,tVj,W + (1 - mj,t)Vj,t+ 1]/( 1 + r).
Note that future income is discounted, with r denoting the interest rate. In the Appendix,
equations (16)-( 19) state the conditions describing the expected lifetime income for workers
in each state of unemployment.
To calculate Vj,w' the expected lifetime income for an employed type j UI-eligible
claimant, we follow the same procedure. Current income is equal to the worker's wage, Wj'
In addition, with probability (1-s) this worker keeps his job for another period and continues
to earn Vj,w' With probability s the worker loses his job and has to search for new
employment, resulting in a future income of Vj,1' Therefore,





Again, the Appendix shows the conditions describing expected lifetime income for workers in
each state of employment -- see equations (20)-(21).
Finally, for each unemployed worker, search effort is chosen to maximize expected
lifetime income. Therefore, there is an equation defining optimal search effort for each
possible state of unemployment -- see equations (22)-(24) in the Appendix -- with one
exception. The exception is made for UI-eligible non-claimants. Presumably, these workers
do not claim UI benefits because they do not expect to be unemployed for a significant length
of time -- that is, they expect to be able to find jobs with relatively little effort. Therefore, we
treat these workers differently by assigning them a high reemployment probability and ignoring
their search decision. Provided that their reemployment probability is set high enough (so that
their expected duration of unemployment is roughly half the expected duration of high-wage
UI-eligible claimants), our results are not sensitive to this treatment.
To investigate the impact of wage subsidies paid to dislocated workers, we solve the
modyl first assuming that there are no wage subsidies. In the absence of wage subsidies, low-
wage workers and dislocated workers face the same wage: that is, w. = w d • We then
introduce a wage subsidy paid to dislocated workers that equals half the difference between
the wage earned before dislocation (wh) and the market opportunity wage now facing the
worker (w,). This implies a subsidy paid to dislocated worker of (wh-w.)/2, so that, w d
increases to (wh + w.)/2. With this change, we resolve the model, and compare the results.
Intuitively, the wage subsidy increases the opportunity cost of unemployment for
dislocated workers, resulting in an increase in search effort by these workers. The increased
search effort lowers their duration of unemployment, increases their steady-state employment
level, and may decrease the employment of other workers. By solving the model for different
12
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wage subsidy programs, we can gauge the magnitude of these different impacts. However,
to do so, we must first set the values of the parameters of the model.
C. The Parameters
The key endogenous variables in the model are employment (J), the number of
unemployed workers in the different states of unemployment (the U measures), the
reemployment (or job match) probabilities for unemployed workers in different states of
unemployment (the m terms), and search effort (or employer contact probability) for
, ,
unemployed workers in different states of unemployment (the p terms). The key parameters
are the fraction of unemployed workers who are ineligible for UI benefits (q), the Ultake-up
rate (k), the job separation or turnover rate (s), the interest rate (r), total available jobs (T), the
size of the labor force (or the total number of workers, L), biweekly UI benefits (x), the
biweekly wages (wh, w.' W d and Wi)' the search-cost parameters (c, ci, and z), the fraction of
UI-eligible claimants who earn high wages (h), and the fraction of low-wage UI-eligible
claimants who are dislocated worker~ (d).
In specifying the parameters, we follow the approach adopted in our earlier work
(Davidson and Woodbury 1993). It is useful to specify a set of parameters that can be taken
as a reference case, although it is important to test the sensitivity of our results to variation
in the parameters, since the existing research suggests a range of values for each of the
parameters. We begin by obtaining values of parameters that are available in existing
research. For example, as noted above, we set q, the proportion of the unemployed who are




For s, the separation rate, we turn to research by Ehrenberg (1.980), Clark and Summers
(1982), and Murphy an~Topel (1987). Their results suggest a biweekly value for s that falls
somewhere in the range of .006-.014 (the mean appears to be .01 with a standard error of
about .004). For r, the interest rate, we consider biweekly values in the range .002-.02, which
translates into annual discount rates that range in value from 5% to 67%.
Consider next T and L. We first note that the model is homogeneous of degree zero
in T and L so that we may set L = 100 without loss of generality. We then note that as T
varies with L held fixed, the model .generates different values for U and V. Research by
Abraham (1983) suggests that U tends to be close to 2V, although it varies over the business
cycle. Although the actual value depends on the other parameters, our model predicts that
U = 2V when T is approxi'mately 96.25 and that for values of T ranging from 95 to 97.5, U
ranges from 1.5V to 3V.
The considerations to this point suggest specifying a reference case in which s = .01,
r = .008, and T = 96.25. As we show below, the results are remarkably insensitive to variation
in s, r, and T within the ranges described above.
For the remainder of the observable parameters, we turn to data collected to analyze .
the Illinois Reemployment Bonus Experiment. 14 In the Illinois experiment, the average biweekly
UI-benefit was $245. We set the biweekly wage earned by "high-wage" workers equal to
$846, and the biweekly wage earned by "low-wage" workers equal to $538. Therefore,
x= $245, w h = $846, and w,= $538.
15
141n the Illinois experiment, a randomly assigned group of new UI claimants were offered a $500
cash bonus if they found a new job within 11 weeks and held the job for 4 months. Their behavior
was compared with that of a randomly assigned control group. The design and results of the
experiment are described in Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987).
151t is impossible to distinguish dislocated workers from other workers in the Illinois experimental
data, so we turn to the Washington Reemployment Bonus experiment (Spiegelman, O'Leary,· and
14
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This leaves the unobservable parameters associated wi,th the cost function (c, ci, and
z), h, and d. For c, ci , and z we use the approach taken in our earlier work (Davidson and
Woodbury 1993), with some modifications: In the earlier work, we found values of c and z
that made the model's predictions match the results observed in the Illinois experiment. 16
Specifically, we found values of the search cost parameters such that (a) the duration of
unemployment predicted by the model in the absence of a reemployment bonus matched the
observed duration of unemployment in the Illinois control group, and (b) the change in
unemployment duration due to the bonus predicted by the model matched the actual change
observed in the Illinois experiment. To find ci, we used estimates by Katz and Meyer (1990)
and Woodbury (1991) of the increase in the expected duration of unemployment brought about
by a 1-week extension of ·Ulbenefits. 17 Using these estimates and the expected duration of
Kline 1992), in which data on worker dislocation were gathered. In the Washington experiment,
15 % of enrollees were dislocated by the standard BLS criteria (that is, employed by the same
employer for at least 3 years prior to job loss), and the base period earnings of these dislocated
workers were 57% higher than the base period earnings of. other workers. Hence, w h = 1.57w,. In
the Illinois experiment, the average base period earnings of all workers in the control group was
$584. This allows us to write $584 = .15(1.57w,) + .85(w,). Solving yields w, ;;:: $538 and w h
$846.
16The $500 Illinois bonus reduced the duration of insured unemployment by .714 week in the
case of workers who were eligible for 26 weeks of state regular benefits. The bonus impact in the
case of workers eligible for an additional 12 weeks of Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC)
appears to have been much greater. The impact of .714 week is smaller than that reported by
Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987), which is 1.13 weeks for state-regular eligibles and FSC-eligibles
combined. The.714.,week estimate, however, is appropriate to our model (which allows for 26
weeks of UI benefits), and is similar to estimates of bonus impacts obtained in similar trials in
Pennsylvania and Was.hington State (Decker and O'Leary 1992). Evidence on impacts of the Illinois
bonus under different potential benefit durations is developed elsewhere (Davidson and Woodbury
1991 ).
Note that we assume the impact of a bonus on dislocated workers is the same as on
workers generally. This accords with the evidence obtained in the Washington Reemployment
Bonus Experiment, where dislocated workers' response to the bonus offer did not differ from the
response of other workers. See Spiegelman, O'Leary, and Kline (1991).
17Katz and Meyer estimate that eligibility for 1 additional week of UI benefits increases the
expected duration of unemployment by .16 to .2 week; Woodbury estimates a larger increase -- .4
week. Our results turn out to be insensitive to which estimate we use.
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unemployment for the control group in Illinois, we could infer the expected duration of
unemployment for UI-ineligibles and then choosecj such that the model's prediction matched
that inferred value.
As noted above, the model used here differs from the model in our earlier work in two
respects -- here we assume that the UI-take up rate is less than 100% and that there are high-
and low-wage workers. We therefore extended the previous model and followed the same
approach to obtain estimates of the search cost parameters. For the reference case, we find
that Z= 1.381, c= 157.8, and cj = 102.8.
The last two parameters areh, the proportion of UI-eligible claimants who are high-
wage workers, and d, the proportion of low-wage UI-eligible claimants who are dislocated
workers. In treating these parameters, we follow two approaches, each reflecting an extreme
assumption. At one extreme, we assume that all unemployed workers (both high- and low-
wage) compete for the same jobs so that, effectively, there is a single labor market. In other
words, workers are heterogeneous but jobs are homogeneous. 18
In the case of a single labor market, once we know h we cab infer d. To see how, let
UHO denote the total number of high-wage UI-eligible claimants before the high-wage sector
shrinks (leading to worker dislocation),· and let UH denote the total number of high-wage UI-
eligible claimants after the dislocated workers lose their jobs. Dislocated workers are defined
to be workers who previously earned high wages and then, after losing their job, can only find
reemployment at the low wage. Suppose that 15% of the UI-eligible claimants who initially
18This appears to violate the law of one price -- high-wage workers get a high wage even
though jobs are all identical. As mentioned earlier, the high wages paid to high-wage workers may
stem from any of several non-competitive forces such as collective bargaining, firm-specific human
capital, or efficiency wage payments.
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earned high wages fit this profile (that is, h = .15).19 Then, the number of dislocated workers
will be .15UHO and the number of high-wage UI-eligible claimants ex-post will be UH = .85UHO'
Finally, since d is defined as the fraction of low-wage UI-eligibles who are dislocated workers,
we have d = .15UHO/Uu where UL denotes the total number of low-wage UI-eligible claimants
after the dislocated workers have lost their jobs. Substituting from above for UHO yields d =
(.15/.85)UH/UL• This expression can be simplified further by using the fact that UH/UL = h/(1-
h). Substitution then yields d = 3h[17(1-h)]. For each wage subsidy program that we
consider, we report results for values of h ranging from .5 to .1 (and, therefore, d ranges from
.176 to .002). As we show below, our results are similar for all such values.
The other extreme is to assume that high- and low-wage workers compete in different
sectors of the labor market. That is, we assume the existence of a dual labor market in which
there are two kinds of workers and two kinds of jobs. If high-wage unemployed workers
compete only for high-wage jobs and low-wage unemployed workers compete only for low-
wage jobs, then crowding-out will be confined to the low-wage sector -- the dislocated
workers (formerly high-wage workers now forced to look for low-wage jobs) are offered a
wage subsidy and search in the low-wage sector. The notion of a dual labor market can be
captured by setting h =0, which essentially splits off the high-wage sector (the northeast
quadrant of Figure 2) and implies that dislocated and low-wage workers compete only for low-
wage jobs.
19The 15% figure is probably an upper bound on the percentage of previously high-wage
workers who become dislocated. Data on worker dislocation that were gathered in evaluating the
Washington Reemployment Bonus Experiment suggest that, using the BLS definition of job loss
after 3 or more years working for the same employer, 15% of new UI recipients were dislocated.
Washington State's criteria, which include considerations such as the industry in which a worker
was employed and whether the UI claim resulted from a plant closing, suggest a figure closer to
5%. Using the Displaced Worker Surveys over the period 1979-1986, Seitchik (1991) finds that
about 10% of all unemployed workers were dislocated (that is, lost their job due to plant closing,
slack work, or job abolition). .
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In modelling the dual labor market, we also need to make an assumption about the
sector in which UI-eligible non-claimants seek jobs. One extreme possibility is that they
compete for jobs only in the high-wage sector, which we can model by setting k = 1. Setting
k = 1 implies that all low-wage workers who are eligible for UI benefits claim those benefits;
there are no UI-eligible non-claimants in the low-wage sector, and any UI-eligible non-claimants
in the economy are seeking high-wage jobs. The alternative possibility is that UI-eligible non-
claimants compete for jobs in the low-wage sector, which we can model by setting k = .75 as
before.
To examine the impact of wage subsidies in the dual labor market model, we allow d
to vary between .15 and .05. These are (approximately) the values of d that correspond with
values of h in the range of .5 to .1 (see the right-most columns of Table 1A). In all cases, we
compare the steady-state equilibria with and without a wage subsidy in order to gauge the
impact of the wage subsidy.
By considering these two extreme cases - a single labor market and a dual labor market
-- we should obtain upper and..lower bounds on the impacts of wage subsidies. Cases in which
. high- and low-wage workers compete for some, but not all, of the same jobs should fall
between our two extreme cases. In addition, cases in which UI-eligible non-claimants compete
for jobs in both the high- and low-wage sectors should fall between the two sets of estimates
we obtain using the alternative dual labor market models.
D. Summary of the Model
The basic set up of the model can be visualized by referring to Figures 1 and 2. Figure
1 shows the groups of workers we consider -- high-wage UI-eligible claimants, low-wage UI-
eligible claimants, dislocated workers, UI-eligible non-claimants, and UI-ineligibles. Several key
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parameters are defined in Figure, 1: k is the UI take-up rate (set at .75); h is the proportion of
UI-eligibles who are high-wage workers (which we allow to vary between .1 and .5); d is the
proportion of low-wage UI-eligibles who are dislocated (which we allow to vary between .02
and .176); and q is the proportion of all unemployed workers who are UI-ineligible (set at .6).
Much of the model's complexity stems from the number of sub-groups of workers we consider
and from the number of states of unemployment through which each of these groups can flow.
It is important to consider these various groups of workers so that crowding-out can be
gauged, and equally important to consider multiple states of unemployment, since incentives
facing a worker can change during a jobless spell.
Figure 2 shows the various labor market states and the flows through the labor market
that are specified by thee model. The flows from state to state are quantified by transition
rates, which depend on reemployment probabilities (or match probabilities, m). These
reemployment probabilities depend in turn on searc.h behavior and the search technology, and
are the outcome of an optimizing choice. Three sets of equations-- for reemployment
probability, expected lifetime income, and optimal search effort -- specify this optimization.
Steady-state equilibrium in. the model is obtained by equating the flows into and out of each
labor market state. The complete structure of the model is set out in the Appendix.
We model worker dislocation" by assuming that there are two employment sectors --
high-wage and low-wage -- and that the economy experiences a one-time shock that shuts
down part of the high-wage sector. Dislocated workers are formerly high-wage workers who
must now search for a low-wage job.
In the model, the total number of jobs available (T) is fixed, but employment (J, or the
number of jobs that are filled) varies with job turnover (the separation rate, s) and the
effectiveness of job search and matching (m). For example, if the rate at which workers
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separate trom jobs (s) increases, then fewer jobs will be filled and unemployment will rise. If
the search intensity of unemployed workers (p, the probability that a workers contacts a firm)
is high, then more jobs will be filled and unemployment wilL be lower.
III. Results
We consider the impacts of two different wage-rate subsidy programs. In each, the
government pays a subsidy to each dislocated worker who gains reemployment equal to half
the difference between the high wage received before dislocation (wh) and the low wage after
reemployment (wt). As a result, the net wage (including the subsidy) received by a dislocated
worker who finds reemployment iswd = (wh +w t )12. In the first program, which we call the
"temporary" program, the worker receives the subsidy for two years after gaining
reemployment. In the second program -- a "permanent" program -- the worker receives the
wage subsidy for as long as employment continues.
In both programs, the wage subsidy increases the opportunity cost of unemployment
for dislocated workers and results in increased search effort on their p~rt. For example, in the
reference case of the permanent program when half of all UI-eligible claimants are high-wage
workers (that is, h = .5), search effort increases by approximately 30% for all dislocated
workers. This increase in search effort of dislocated workers has the following implications:
o There is an increase in overall steady-state employment. That is, more of the
total available jobs are filled as dislocated workers are induced to search harder
for and accept jobs that would otherwise have remained vacant. This increase
in total employment is small, since the wage-rate subsidy is offered to a small
portion of the labor force (dislocated workers).
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o Reemployment probabilities and employment levels rise for dislocated workers
and fall for all other workers, who are beaten to vacancies and crowded out of
the labor market by the more'aggressive dislocated workers. (The larger the
increase in overall steady-state employment, the less crowding out occurs.)
o As the reemployment probabilities of non-dislocated workers change, their
optimal search effort changes. That is, as it becomes more difficult for the non-
dislocated workers to find jobs, their search effort adjusts.
These three impacts of the wage subsidy can be thought of respectively as a gross
employment effect, a crowding-out effect, and a rivalry effect. Note that the gross
employment effect is an increase in total employment that is driven by the increase in search
effort of dislocated workers. The increase in employment of dislocated workers is offset at
least partially by decreases in employment of some other groups of workers. This offset .is the
crowding-out effect. The rivalry effect is the most subtle of the three effects -- it implies that
the increased search intensity of dislocated workers, who are now offered a wage subsidy,
is taken into account by other workers when they choose their optimal search intensity. Since
dislocated workers make up only a small fraction of the total labor force (and of job seekers),
the rivalry effect turns out to be extremely small. For example, in the reference case of the
permanent program with h = .5, no non-dislocated worker alters search ef~ort by more than
.5% as a result of the wage subsidy. 20 Accordingly, we focus on the gross employment and
crowding-out effects of the wage subsidy from here on.
2°lt is not surprising that the rivalry effect is so small in the 'case of a wage subsidy to
dislocated workers. In our work on the displacement (or crowding-out) effects of a reemployment
bonus, we also found small rivalry effects, and the program we were modelling was offered to a far
larger proportion of unemployed workers (Davidson and Woodbury 1993).
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A. Impacts on Dislocated Workers
Tables 1A and 18 show the simulated impacts of the temporary wage subsidy -- that
is, one that is paid during the first 2 years after reemployment -- in the reference case as h (the
fraction of UI-eligibles who are high-wage workers) and d (the fraction of low-wage UI-eligibles
who are dislocated) vary. The results suggest that a wage subsidy lasting 2 years would
reduce a dislocated worker's expected duration of unemployment by nearly 2 weeks, and
would increase employment of dislocated workers by about 900 to 1,000 per 100,000 labor
force participants (see the "Dislocated workers" columns in Tables 1A and 18).
As the tables indicate, the simulated impacts of the temporary wage subsidy are robust
to changes in hand d. Also, there islittle difference between the impacts simulated using a
single labor market model and those simulated using a dual labor market model.
, Whether the~e impacts on expected duration of unemployment and employment are
large or small is a question that can only be answered in a relative sense. In section 111.0
below, we compare the impacts of the wage subsidy with impacts of a $500 reemployment
bonus offered to workers who gain reemployment within 12 weeks. The results suggest that,
compared with such a reemployment bonus, the temporary wage subsidy would have roughly
twice the impact on the duration of unemployment and level of employment of dislocated
workers. We discuss the significance of these relative impacts further in section 111.0.
Tables 2A and 28 show the impacts of a wage subsidy that is paid in perpetuity to a
dislocated worker who gains reemployment. The results suggest that a permanent program
would reduce a dislocated worker's expected duration of unemployment by nearly 5 weeks,
and would increase employment of dislocated workers by about 2,200 to 2,400 per 100,000
in the labor force. These impacts are roughly two and a half times the impacts estimated for
the temporary wage subsidy. In results ~ot reported in the tables, we have examined the
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sensitivity of the difference between the temporary and permanent programs to different
discount rates (r). Not surprisingly, we find that the differences between the temporary and
permanent programs decrease at higher discount rares, but only slightly.21 That is, when
distant wage subsidy payments are discounted more heavily, the impact of the permanent
prograrT:l is slightly closer to the impact of the temporary program. It is unclear whether the
discount rate we are using in the reference case -- .008, or about 20% annually -- should be
considered particularly high. Given the nature of social programs, participants could well
discount future benefits promised by a permanent wage subsidy program at even higher rates.
Tables 2A and 28 indicate that, as with the temporary wage subsidy, the simulated
impacts of the permanent wage subsidy are robust to changes in hand d. Also, it makes little
difference whether we assume that there is a single labor market or a dual labor market model.
8. Crowding-Out Effects
Although the wage subsidy considered here is provided only to dislocated workers, it
has the potential to affect the unemployn:ent duration and employment prospects of other
workers. The reason is that if the wage subsidy does increase the search intensity of
dislocated workers, then job vacancies will be filled more quickly than otherwise by dislocated
workers, and vacancies that otherwise would have been available to non-dislocated workers
will vanish. In effect, the wage subsidy will motivate dislocated workers to beat other workers
to the vacancies, lengthening the unemployment duration and reducing employment of other
workers. If the improved well-being of dislocated workers did come at the expense of other
21This is true when we apply the values of the search cost parameters(c, ci , and zl used in the
reference case to models that use different interest rates.
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workers, then the wage subsidy would be a far less attractive policy than if such costs were
not imposed on other workers.
Tables 1A and 1B show impacts of the wage subsidy on the other groups of workers
considered in the model -- high-wage UI-eligible claimants, low-wage UI-eligible claimants, UI-
eligible non-claimants, and UI-ineligibles. The extent to which these groups of workers are
crowded out by the wage subsidy to dislocated workers can be considered in two ways -- first
by looking at impacts on the duration of unemployment, and second by looking at impacts on
steady-state employment.
By the first criterion -- impact on unemployment duration -- the model suggests that the
crowding-out effects of the wage subsidy to dislocated workers are rather small. The results
in Table 1A suggest that the impacts on unemployment duration are largest for low-
UI-eligible claimants, but even these low-wage UI-eligibles would suffer at worst an
<:lIrf'.... '+'nn""'l half day (.0806 to .0965 week) of unemployment per spell as a result of the wage
to dislocated workers. In other words, any crowding-out effects of the wage subsidy
dispersed so that they do not fall heavily on any particular group of workers.
But by the second criterion -- impact on employment of workers other than dislocated
,n",rlr,ore- -- the simulations suggest that crowding out is virtually complete (see Table 1B). That
all of the employment gains experienced by dislocated workers come at the expense
In~""'TO,r1 workers. For example, in the reference case for the single labor market and
the employment of dislocated workers rises by 989 per 100,000 workers in the labor
but employment of other workers combined falls by 982 per 100,000. Similar results
for the other cases displayed in Table 1B.
Crowding out is nearly complete in this model because the employment gains that result
offering a wage subsidy to a small percentage of unemployed workers (in this case,
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dislocated workers) are correspondingly small. Employment gains occur in this model through
increases in the search intensity of workers who are offered an inducement (such as a wage
subsidy) to search harder. When search intensity increases, vacancies disappear and more of
the total available jobs in the economy are filled. If only a few workers are offered such an
inducement, employment rises only modestly. Recall that the wage subsidy can increase
employment even though the total number of available jobs (T) is fixed in the model. Since
T =V +J (total available jobs equal the sum of vacancies and jobs that are filled), inducements
to search harder cause V to fall and J to rise.
To illustrate the dependence of the crowding out results on the fact that the wage
subsidy is offered only to a few workers, we have run a simulation in which a temporary (two-
year) wage subsidy is offered to all low-wage UI-eligible claimants, rather than just to
dislocated workers. We find that employment of low-wage UI-eligible claimants increases by
868 per 100,000 in the labor force, and that the total decrease in employment of other groups
(high-wage UI eligible claimants, UI-eligible non-claimants, and UI-ineligibles) is only 314. In
other words, when the wage subsidy is offered to 12.4% of the unemployed (alilow-~ageUI-
eligible claimants), only. 36 job is crowded out by each job gained. When the wage subsidy
is offered to just 2.6% of the unemployed (dislocated workers only), nearly 1 job is crowded
out by each job gained.
Although nearly all the gains accruing to dislocated come at the expense of other
workers, it is nevertheless clear that no particular group of workers is especially burdened by
the crowding-out effects of the wage subsidy. That is, as was clear in Table 1A, the




Tables 2A and 28 show the crowding-out effects of a permanent wage subsidy. Table
2A suggests that the permanent wage subsidy would increase the unemployment duration of
non-dislocated workers by more than twice as, much as the temporary wage subsidy. For
example, the most affected group -- low-wage UI-eligible claimants -- would experience up to
an additional day or so (.2024 to .2431 week) of unemployment per spell as a result of the
permanent wage subsidy. Again, however, the crowding-out effects of the permanent wage
subsidy are dispersed across the various groups of non-dislocated workers. This cost of the
permanent wage subsidy is offset by a proportionate benefit to dislocated workers. 22
To summarize, the simulations suggest that the crowding-out effects of the wage
subsidy are virtually complete for all cases we cgnsider. In our reference case, 99°1<> of the
increased employment of dislocated workers comes at the expense of other workers.
Crowding out is nearly complete because the wage subsidy is offered to only a small segment
of the unemployed, and hence generates only small employment gains. (A wage subsidy
offered to all low-wage workers is accompanied by much less crowding out, in contrast to a
.wage subsidy offered to dislocated workers only.) Although crowding out is nearly complete,
the crowding out of non-dislocated workers by dislocated workers is spread quite evenly over
the various groups of non-dislocated workers, so that no single group bears the brunt of the
wage subsidy's crowding-out effect. That is, each group of non-dislocated workers
experiences a slight increase in unemployment duration and a slight decrease in employment
level.
22We would need to introduce an explicit social welfare function if we wanted to draw
conclusions about whether the temporary or permanent program has greater social benefits. We




The results to this point have all focussed on the reference case in which r = .008, s
.010, and T = 96.25. We now explore the sensitivity of the results to changes in the
separation rate s and the total number of jobs available T. We focus on variations in these two
parameters because doing so may give insight into how the effects of a wage subsidy would
vary over the business cycle. Slack labor markets are associated with fewer total available
jobs (T) and a lower job separation rate (s). So by examining how the impacts of the wage
subsidy behave as T and s fall, we can learn how a recession might alter the outcomes that
could be expected from a wage subsidy.
Tables 3 and 4 show the simulated effects of a wage subsidy with a higher and a lower
separation rate s. In Tables 3A and 38, we have set s equal to .006, whereas in Tables 4A
and 48, s = .014. Together Tables 3 and 4 show that when separation rates are higher, the
wage subsidy causes smaller reductions in the unemployment duration of dislocated workers,
but causes larger increases in their employment. This ambiguity occurs because there are two
effects of a higher separations rate, s. First, when s is higher, the duration of jobs is shorter.
This implies that the wage subsidy is worth less to a worker who receives it (because jobs are
less enduring), so workers who could receive the subsidy respond less strongly -- that is, their
search effort increases by less. It follows that a higher s implies smaller reductions in
unemployment duration of dislocated workers. Second, when s is higher, there are more job
vacancies. Hence, even though workers' search effort increases by less (as just noted), even
the moderated increase in search effort generates more employment. So the additional






The wage subsidy's impact on unemployment duration of dislocated workers is not
especially sensitive to changes in s in the range of .006 to .014 -- the variation is on the order
of 25 to 33%. (See, for example,the top rows of Tables 3A and 4A: for s = .006, the wage
subsidy's impact on unemployment duration is -2.378 weeks, whereas for s = .014, the impact
is -1.778 week.) But the wage subsidy's impact on employment of dislocated workers varies
greatly with changes in s in the range of .006 to .014 -- on the order of 75 to 90%. (See the
top rows of Tables 38 and 48: for s = .006, the wage subsidy increases employment by 713
per 100,000, whereas for s = .014, the impact is 1243 per 100,000.) In either case, however,
crowding-out of non-dislocated workers is nearly complete (over 99%), and most of the
employment gains of dislocated workers come at the expense of other workers.
Tables 5 and 6 show the simulated effects of a wage subsidy when total available jobs
are higher and lower than the reference case. In Tables 5A and 58, T is set at 95, whereas
in Tables 6A and 68, T = 97.5. Tables 5 and 6 show that when there are more jobs available,
the wage subsidy causes both smaller reductions in the unemployment duration of dislocated
workers and smaller gains in employment. 23 However, the changes in T we consider (95 to
97.5) lead to relatively small changes in the wage subsidy's impact on both unemployment
duration and employment of dislocated workers -- on the order of 7 to 11 %. (Regarding
unemployment duration, for example, the top rows of Tables 5A and 6A show that for T = 95,
the wage subsidy's impact on unemployment duration is -2.077 weeks, whereas for T = 97.5,
the impact is -1.877 weeks. Regarding employment levels, the top rows of Tables 58 and 68
show that for T = 95, the wage subsidy increases employment by 1038 per 100,000, whereas
23The wage subsidy's impacts are smaller when T is larger because when T is high, jobs are
available and unemployment is low. As a result, workers are able to find jobs quickly even without
searching hard. In effect, search effort is less important to job search outcomes when jobs are
abundant. Since the wage subsidy increases search effort, it has a smaller impact when T is high.
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for T = 97.5, the impact is 937 per 100,000.) It follow that the crowding-out effect is
basically invariant to changes in the total number of jobs available.
We conclude that the basic results described for the reference case do not change
appreciably when' the separation rate (s) and total jobs available (T) vary over a fairly
significant range. The direct impacts of the wage subsidy on disloc,ated workers change
am biguously with variation in s, but unambiguously increase with increases in T. Crowding
out is virtually unaffected by changes in either s or T, and is virtually complete in all cases.
D. Comparisons with a Reemployment Bonus
The Clinton Administration's Reemployment Act (REA) would enable state employment
security agencies to offer a reemployment bonus to dislocated workers. 24 Such a
reemployment bonus program would offer a lump-sum cash payment to dislocated workers
who find reemployment within about 3 months of losing their job, and who hold that new job
for at least 4 months.
The similarities between a reemployment bonus and a wage rate subsidy invite
comparison. Both attempt to encourage the reemployment of dislocated workers by offering
a financial inducement to dislocated workers to seek and accept a new job. The main
difference between the two is in the way the financial inducement is structured. The
reemployment bonus is a relatively large one-time payment provided about 7 months after job
24Actually, the bonus wouldbe offered to workers who meet the state's "profiling" criteria --
that is, to workers who are predicted to have a high probability of eXhausting their UI benefits.
Conceptually, the correspondence between workers who meet the profiling criteria and dislocated
workers is incomplete. But in our model, dislocated workers are those who have lost high-wage
jobs and have little expectation of returning to such jobs. Hence, they have long expected
durations of unemployment and would meet most conceivable profiling criteria. In other words, the
correspondence between the model's dislocated workers and profiled workers is reasonably good.
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loss, whereas the wage subsidy is a smaller but continuing payment provided over a longer
period of time. Also, the wage subsidy does not require workers to find reemployment within
as short a time as 3 months.
Two obvious questions arise about reemployment bonuses and wage subsidies. First,
how do their direct and indirect impacts differ? Second, can a reemployment bonus and a
wage subsidy be structured so as to have identical incentives and impacts?
Tables 7A and 78 display the impacts of a $500 cash bonus offered to dislocated
workers who find a new job within 12 weeks. The flat $500 bonus is a natural one to
examine because it was tested in the Illinois experiment, the results of which we have used
to calibrate our model. Also, the $500 bonus r~presents 3 to 4 times the average weekly
benefit amount received by UI recipients in the Illinois experiment, and the reemployment
bonus programs enabled by the proposed Reemployment Act call for a bonus of similar size.
To obtain the results shown in Tables 7A and 78, we used the model, method of calibration,
and solution algorithm described in section II'. Also, the parameters used are the same as
those used in the standard case underlying Tables 1A and 18, so differences between the
wage subsidy and the reemployment bonus can be understood by comparing Tables 1 and 7.
The figures displayed in Tables 7A and 78 are remarkable because they suggest that
the direct impacts of the $500 bonus are uniformly about one-half the impacts of a wage
subsidy. For example, the bonus-induced reduction in the· unemployment duration of
dislocated workers -- about .9 weeks -- is about half the reduction induced by the wage
subsidy (see Table 1A). The bonus-induced increase in employment of dislocated workers --
about 450 to 470 per 100,000 -- is about half the increase induced by the wage subsidy (see
Table 18). With both the reemployment bonus and the wage subsidy, the employment gains
of dislocated workers are offset nearly one for one by employment losses for other workers.
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(For example, in the first row of Table 78, dislocated workers' employment gain of 447 is
offset by a loss of 443 for other workers. In the first row of Table 18, the gain of 989 is
offset by a loss of 982. So in both case, relative crowding-out is virtually complete.)
We conclude that the direct impacts of a reemployment bonus are qualitatively the
same as those of a wage subsidy -- the differences are a just matter of scaling. It follows that
it should be possible to structure a reemployment bonus and a wage subsidy so. that they have
identical incentives and impacts. Using our model, it is straightforward to find the bonus
amount that would have the same impact as the wage subsidy for 9ur reference .9ase. For the
single labor market model with h = .5, we find that a bonus of $1,104 would have direct and
indirect impacts identical to the temporary wage subsidy.
We concluded above that the temporary wage subsidy has an impact that is about
twice that of the $500 reemployment bonus. On the other hand, the wage subsidy's impact
comes at considerably more that twice the expense. Since the wage subsidy amounts to
$1 54 biweekly [( $846-$ 538)/2 = $154], the amount paid in wage subsidies to a. worker
would exceed the $500 bonus payment after only two months. 25
This added expense of the wage subsidy needs to considered in light of the loses
experienced by dislocated workers. Jacobson, lalonde, and Sullivan (1993) have argued that
the case for a wage subsidy is not so much improved efficiency as greater equity. That is, the
purpose of a wage subsidy is to redistribute income to workers who have lost their jobs due
to economic restructuring, in addition to getting dislocated workers back to work..
The wage subsidy could be viewed as a better method of transferring income to
dislocated workers than the reemployment bonus because the bonus is paid only to workers




who are fortunate enough to find reemployment within about 3 months. The wage subsidy,
on the other hand, would be paid to a dislocated worker regardless of when he or she gained
reemployment.
E. Extensions: Firm Behavior
The model we have used makes no attempt to model firm behavior. In fact, our firms
are quite passive -- when they have a vacancy they randomly choose from the pool of
applicants and pay a wage that is determined outside of the model. Moreover, the total
number of jobs available (T) is fixed, so that we do not allow the demand for labor to change
as the result of the wage subsidy. (The number of steady~statevacancies is endogenous and
falls with the implementation of the wage subsidy. That is why crowding out of non-
dislocated workers is not quite complete.)
We begin this section by indicating the reasonableness of the assumptions that the
wage and T are exogenous. However, we also describe how our model could be extended to
make the wages an9 T endogenous, and discuss the sensitivity of our results to these
assumptions.
There are several reasons to expect that wage rates would not change after the
implementation of the wage subsidy program. First, the wage subsidy is offered to a small
fraction of the unemployed and it is not likely that a change in the behavior of a fraction of the
unemployed could have significant aggregate wage effects. This is exactly why so few jobs
are created by the wage subsidy in the first place -- even though all dislocated workers search
harder, there are too few of them to have a large aggregate impact. Second, experimental
evidence suggests strongly that a reemployment bonus program induces no change in wage
rates (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987; Decker and O'Leary 1992). Since the reemployment
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bonus and wage subsidy programs have similar behavioral impacts, one would expect them
to have similar wage effects. Third, in an early version of our work on the crowding-out (or
displacement) effects of reemployment bonu~es, we developed a model similar in flavor to the
one used here, except that it allowed for endogenous wage rates (see Davidson and Woodbury
1990). We did so by introducing two profit functions for firms--one that calculates the
expected lifetime profit for a firm with a filled job and one that calculates the expected lifetime
profit for a firm with a vacancy. We then assumed that wages are negotiated once the worker
and firm make contact and that the resulting wage divides evenly the surplus created by the
job. Our model predicted that the reemployment bonus would have almost no impact on
wages, which is exactly what happened in the.reemployment bonus experiments. It follows
that if we extended the model presented in this paper in a similar manner, we would again
obtain the prediction that wage subsidies to dislocated workers should produce no significant
changes in wage rates. The cost of extending the model in such a manner is rather high,
however, in that the model would more than double in size.
It is also possible to extend our model so that T is endogenously determined. To do so,
we could follow Pissarides (1990) and assume that firms create vacancies until the expected
profit from doing so equals the cost of creating the vacancy. 26 Since the wage subsidy
increases search effort, it reduces the expected duration of a vacancy, ,thereby making it more
profitable for firms to create vacancies. Thus, if T does change as the result of the wage
subsidy, it should increase, which would reduce the amount of crowding-out suggested by our
simulations. We would expect, however, that any change in T would be quite small since the
wage subsidy changes the behavior of so few workers.
26Although this extension of the model is straightforward theoretically, calibration would be
difficult. Given the limited amount of vacancy data available, it would be difficult to pin down the
cost of creating a vacancy.
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To test the s~nsitjvity of our results to the assumption that T (total available jobs) is
exogenous, we have calculated the increase in T that would be necessary to completely
reverse our crowding-out results. That is, we calculate the change in T that would need to
result from the wage subsidy to dislocated workers so that employment would be unchanged
for other workers. Although the exact value varies with the parameters, we find that T would
have to increase somewhere between .025 and .03 percent for there to be no crowding out.
This is quite a small increase -- in the neighborhood of 30,000 to 40,000 jobs for the U.S.
labor market. Whether this is plausible is an open question. The apparent sensitivity of
crowding out to changes in total jobs available weakens our crowding-out results considerably,
and suggests the potential importance of extending the model to make T endogenous. This
is the focus of our work in progress.
IV. Discussion and Conclusions
This examination of a wage bill subsidy paid to dislocated workers has focussed on the
subsidy's impacts on the duration of unemployment and le,,:els of employment of dislocated
and other workers. Our main results can be .summarized as follows. The temporary wage
subsidy program, which provides a subsidy for two years after gaining reemployment, has
large direct impacts on the unemployment duration and employment level of dislocated
workers. The results of our reference case suggest that the two-year subsidy would shorten.
the unemployment spells of dislocated workers by nearly 2 weeks, and would increase
employment of dislocated workers by about 900 to 1000 per 100,000 in the labor force.
(These findings are summarized in Tables 1A and 18.) A wage subsidy paid in perpetuity
would have impacts on dislocated workers that are about two and a half times those estimated
for the temporary wage subsidy (see Tables 2A and 28).
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Wage subsidies to dislocated workers could also have indirect impacts on workers other
than dislocated workers. Specifically, our results suggest that the wage subsidy leads to small
increases in the unemployment duration, and decreases in employment, of non-dislocated
workers. These decreases are relatively evenly dispersed across the various groups of non-
dislocated workers we examine -- high- and low-wage UI eligibles, UI-eligible non-claimants,
and UI-ineligibles. But on net, virtually all of the employment gains experienced by dislocated
workers as a result of the wage subsidy come at the expense of other workers (see Tables 1B
and 2B).
These main results appear to be quite robust to changes in the parameters that must
be supplied in order to obtain our simulations (as shown in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6). The
crowding-out results, however, are very sensitive to the assumption that the total number of
available jobs (T) is fixed and exogenous. As we report in section III.E, if employers responded
to a wage subsidy for dislocated workers by increasing labor demand by just .025 to .03
percent, there would be no crowding out of non-dislocated workers.
We find that a reemployr:nent bonus can be structured so as to obtain impacts identical
to the wage subsidy. Specifically, in our reference case, a reemployment bonus of about
$1,100 offered to workers who gain reemployment within 12 weeks of losing their job would
have direct and indirect impacts that are identical to a temporary (two-year) wage subsidy.
If the crowding-out effects of the wage subsidy are as large as our main results
suggest, then a wage subsidy to dislocated workers fails the Pareto criterion because some
workers could be hurt by the program. But there may be three mitigating factors. First, the
structural changes that lead to worker dislocation presumably improve the lot of the majority
at the expense of dislocated workers. It is the burden of structural change, which itself fails
the Pareto criterion, that the wage subsidy is intended to redress. Second, the crowding-out
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impacts of the wage subsidy that we find in our main results are widely dispersed over various
groups of non-dislocated workers. Third, as just mentioned, our crowding-out results are quite
sensitive to the assumption that the total number of available jobs is exogenous, so they
should be treated as provisional.
We have not attempted to treat the administrative or funding issues that would need
to be addressed it a wage subsidy for dislocated workers were adopted. It is clear, however,
that the UI system provides a natural administrative vehicle for a wage subsidy program,
specifically through continued payment of benefits (or some portion of benefits) to dislocated
workers after reemployment. Thisin turn suggests a method of funding based on a dislocated
worker's maximum UI benefit entitlement. For example, in the simulations reported above, a
biweekly subsidy of $154was paid to dislocated workers who were eligible for biweekly UI
benefits of $245. Hence, in this example, a worker's UI benefit entitlement could fund up to
about 41 weeks of a wage subsidy. Funding a wage subsidy that lasted longer or that began
after some weeks of UI benefits had already been paid would require addit~onal funding
sources, and it is unclear where such funding could be found given the severe budget
restrictions currently facing the. federal government.
In any event, these administrative and funding issues would be "moot if the direct
impacts of a wage subsidy paid to dislocated workers were small, and they may yet be moot
given the possibility that the wage subsidy may have harmful indirect impacts on workers
other than dislocated workers. Mitigating the crowding-out effects of the wage subsidy are
three factors -- that the crowding-out effeGts are widely dispersed, that the structural changes
that result in dislocation of some workers (and hence a need for a policy like the wage subsidy)
benefit most other workers, and that our crowding-out results are quite fragile. Our main
purpose has been to appraise the direct and indirect impacts of the wage subsidy, and we
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Appendix: Complete Statement of the Model
A. Identities
(1) T = J + V
(2) L = J + U
B. Steady-State Conditions
In each equation below, the left-hand-side represents the flow into a state and the right-
hand-side represents the flow out of that state. The labor market state for each equation is
listed to the right in parentheses.
(4) qsJ = mjU j (state Uj)
(5) (1-q)(1-k)sJ = mkUk (state Uk)
(6) (1-q)khsJ = Uh" (state Uh,,)
(7) (1-q)k(1-h)(1-d)sJ = Ut" (state Ut,,)
(8) (1-q) k( 1-h)dsJ = Ud" (state Ud, , )
(9) (1-mo t_,)Uo t-, = UO t (state Uj,t for 2 ~ t ~ 14, j = h, ~, d)j, j, j,
(10) (1-mj,'4)Uj,'4 = mj,eUj,e (state Uj,e for j = h, ~, d)
C. Reemployment Probabilities
(13) mj,t = Pj,t(VIT)[(1 - e-~)/A]
(14) mj,e = Pj,e(V/T)[(1 -e-~)/A]
for 1 ~ t ~ 14, j = h, ~, d
for j = h, ~, d
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E. Optimal Search Effort
(22) Pi = arg max Vi
(23) Pj,t = arg max Vj,t for 1 ~ t ~ 14, j = h,~,d
(24) Pj,e = arg max Vj,e for j = h,~,d
(25) Pk = Ph,e
D. Expected Lifetime Income
(16) V j = -cj(pr + [miVj,w + (1-m j)VJ/(1 + r)
(17) Vj,t = x - c(Pj,t)Z + [mj,tVj,w + (1-mj,t)Vj,t;1]/(1 + r)
for 1 ~ t ~ 13, j = h,~,d
(18) Vj,14 = x - C(Pj,14)Z + [mj,14Vj,w + (1-mj,14)Vj,e]/(1 +r)
for j = h,~,d
(19) Vj,e = -c(Pj,e)Z + [mj,eVj,w + (1-mj,e)Vj,e]/(1 + r)
for j = h,~,d
(20) Vi,w = Wi + [sVi + (1-s)Vi,w]/( 1 + r)
(21) Vj,w = w j + [SVj,1 + (1-s)Vj,w]/(1 +r)
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for j = h,~,d
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Effects of a Temporary Wage Subsidy on Expected Duration of Unemployment,
Reference Case
High-wage Low-wage
Dislocated UI-eligible UI-eligible UI-eligible
Model and Assumptions workers claimants claimants non-claimants UI-ineligibles h k d
Single Labor Market -1.979 .0348 .0544 .0164 .0384 .5 .75 .176
-1.966 .0272 .0425 .0127 .0300 .4 .75 .118
-1.954 .0199 .0310 .0095 .0219 .3 .75 .076
-1.942 .0128 .0199 .0064 .0140 .2 .75 .044
-1.931 .0064 .0099 .0031 .0070 .1 .75 .020
Dual Labor Market, with -1.846 NA .0806 .0245 .0569 0 .75 .15
UI-eligible non-claimants
-1.871 NA .0536 .0163 .0379 0 .75 .10in low-wage sector
-1.895 NA .0268 .0081 .0189 0 .75 .05
Dual Labor Market, with -1.748 NA .0965 NA .0682 0 1 .15
UI-eligible non-claimants
-1.778 NA .0642 NA .0453 0 1 .10in high-wage sector
-1.807 NA .0320 NA .0226 0 1 .05
Notes: The wage subsidy modelled is one in which the. wage paid to a reemployed dislocated worker (wd) is half the difference between the wage earned
before dislocation (wh) and the market opportunity wage currently facing the worker (w,). Hence, Wd =(Wh +W.)/2. The subsidy is limited to two
years.
Results shown are for the reference case in which the biweekly separation rate s= .010, total jobs available T=96.25, and the biweekly interest
rate r= .008.
h denotes the fraction of UI-eligible claimants who are high-wage workers; k denotes the UI take-up rate; and d denotes the fraction of low-wage
VI-eligible claimants who are dislocated workers. In the single labor market model, d=3h/[17(1-h)], as shown in the text. In the dual labor
nlarket models, d and k are independent.
Table 1B




Dislocated VI-eligible VI-eligible ill-eligible
Model and Assumptions workers claimants claimants non-claimants VI-ineligibles Total h k d
Single Labor Market 989 -213 -331 -201 -237 -982 .5 .75 .176
982 -214 -336 -198 -229 -977 .4 .75 .118
977 -207 -331 -207 -228 -973 .3 .75 .076
971 -226 -323 -194 -226 -969 .2 .75 .044
965 -193 -321 -193 -257 -964 .1 .75 .020
Dual Labor Market, with 922 NA -399 -237 -275 -911 0 .75 .15
UI-eligible non-claimants
935 NA -406 -246 -275 -927 0 .75 .10in low-wage sector
947 NA -413 -295 -236 -944 0 .75 .05
Dual Labor Market, with 873 NA -505 NA -354 -859 0 1 .15
VI-eligible non-claimants
888 NA -518 NA -361 -879 0 1 .10in high-wage sector
903 NA -532 NA -366 -898 0 1 .05
Notes: See Table IA.
Table 2A
Effects of a Permanent Wage Subsidy on Expected Duration of Unemployment,
Reference Case
High-wage Low-wage
Dislocated VI-eligible VI-eligible VI-eligible
Model and Assumptions workers claimants claimants non-claimants VI-ineligibles h k d
Single Labor Market ~4.941 .0870 .1361 .0822 .0959 .5 .75 .176
-4.908 .0680 .1061 .0644 .0748 .4 .75 .118
-4.876 .0498 .0774 .0474 .0546 .3 .75 .076
-4.846 .0321 .0497 .0306 .0351 .2 .75 ,.044
-4.815 .0160 .0247 .0153 .0174 .1 .75 .020
Dual Labor Market, with -4.627 NA .2024 .1232 .1429 0 .75 .15
VI-eligible non-claimants -- ':'4.680 NA- .1344 .0818 .0949 0 .10in low-wage sector .75
-4.733 NA .0669" .0408 .0473 0 .75 .05
Dual Labor Market, with -4.393 NA .2431 NA .1717 0 1 .15
VI-eligible non-claimants
-4.457 NA .1612in high-wage sector NA .1139 0 1 .10
.;.4.521 NA .0802 NA .0567 0 1 .05
Notes: The wage subsidy modelled is one in which the wage p3:id to a reemployed dislocated worker (wd) is half the difference between the wage earned
before dislocation (wh) and the market opportunity wage' now facing the worker (w.). Hence, wd =(wh +w.)/2. The subsidy is paid in perpetuity.
Results shown are for the reference case in which the biweekly separation rate (s)=.010, total jobs available (1)=96.25, and the biweekly
interest rate (r) = .008.
h denotes the fraction of VI-eligible claimants who are high-wage workers; k denotes the VI take-up rate; and d denotes the fraction of low-wage
VI-eligible claimants who are dislocated workers. In the single labor market model, d=3h/[17(l-h)], as shown in the text. In the dual labor
market models, d and k are independent.
Table 2B




Dislocated UI-eligible UI-eligible UI-eligible
Model and Assumptions workers claimants claimants non-claimants UI-ineligibles Total h k d
Single Labor Market 2469 -536 -833 -500 -583 -2452 .5 .75 .176
2453 -530 -834 -500 -576 -2440 .4 .75 .118
2437 -526 -809 -485 -607 -2427 .3 .75 .076
2422 . -509 -826 -509 -572 -2416 .2 .75 .044
2407 -520 -780 -520 -584 -2404 .1 .75 .020
Dual Labor Market, with 2311 NA -990. -600
,
-695 -2285 0 .75 .15
VI-eligible non-claimants
2339 NA -1001 ' -609 -711 -2321 0 .75 .10in low-wage sector
2366 NA -1014 -627 -716 -2357 0. .75 .05
Dual Labor Market, with 2193 NA -1266 NA -891 -2157 0 1 .15
VI-eligible non-claimants
2227 NA -1297 NA -906· -2203 0- 1 .10in high-wage sector
2260 NA -1317 NA -931 -2248 0 1 .05
Notes: See Table 2A.
Table 3A
Effects of a Temporary Wage Subsidy on Expected Duration of Unemployment,
Sensitivity Analysis with s=.006
High-wage Low-wage
Dislocatedw VI-eligible VI-eligible VI-eligible
Model and Assumptions orkers claimants claimants non-claimants Vl..ineligibles h k d
Single Labor Market -2.378 .0486 .0844 .0447 .0614 .5 .75 .176
-2.351 .0378 .0653 .0349 .0476 .4 .75 .118
-2.325 .0276 .0472 .0257 .0344 .3 .75 .076
-2.300 .0177 .0301 ;0166 .0220 .2 .75 .044
-2.275 .0879 .0149 .0080 .0109 .1 .75 .020
Dual Labor Market, with -2.145 NA .1206 .0651 .0880 0 ..75 .15
VI-eligible non-claimants
-2.181 NA .0802 .0433 .0585 0 .75 .10in low-wage sector
-2.216 NA .0400 .0216 .0292 0 .75 .05
Dual Labor Market, with -1.980 NA .1412 NA .1031 0 1 .15
VI.;.eligible non-claimants
.-2.022 NA .0939 NA .0686 0 1 .10in high-wage sector
-2.064 NA .0468 NA .0342 0 1 .05
Notes: See Table lA.
Change per 100,000 in Employment under a Temporary Wage Subsidy,
Sensitivity Analysis with s= .006
Non-Dislocated Workers
High-wage Low-wage
Dislocated UI-eligible UI-eligible UI-eligible
Model and Assumptions workers claimants claimants non-claimants UI-ineligibles Total h k d
Single Labor Market 713 -148 -247 -138 -178 -711 .5 .75 .176
705 -138 -251 -138 -176 -703 .4 .75 .118
697 -139 -244 -139 -174 -696 .3 .75 .076
690 -133 -238 -133 -185 -689 .2 .75 .044
683 -171 -228 -113 ~171 -683 .1 .75 .020
Dual Labor Market, with 643 NA -282 -156 -203 -641 0 .75 .15
VI-eligible non-claimants
654 NA -285 -154 -214 -653 0 .75 .10in Low-wage sector
665 NA -285 -166 -213 -664 0 .75 .05
Dual Labor Market, with 594 NA -344 NA -248 -592 0 1 .15
VI-eligible non-claimants
607 NA -346 NA -259 -605 0 1 .10in high-wage sector
619 NA -361 NA -257 -618 0 1 .05
See Table 1A.
Table 4A
Effects of a Temporary Wage Subsidy on Expected Duration of Unemployment,
Sensitivity Analysis with s=.014
High-wage Low-wage
Dislocated VI-eligible VI-eligible VI-eligible
Model and Assumptions workers claimants claimants non-claimants UI-ineligibles h k d
Single Labor Market -1.778 .0299 .0441 .0291 .0303 .5 .75 .176
-1.770 .0235 .0346 .0218 .0237 .4 .75 .118
-1.762 .0172 .0253 .0164 .0174 .3 .75 .076
-1.755 .0111 .0163 .0105 .0112 .2 .75 .044
-1.747 .0056 .0081 .0055 .0056 .1 .75 .020
Dual Labor Market, with -1.679 NA .0665 .0426 .0458 0 .75 .15
UI-eligibIe non-claimants
-1.699 NA .0443 .0286 .0305 0 .75 .10in low-wage sector
-1.719 NA .0221 .0139 .0152 0 .75 .05
Dual Labor Market, with -1.604 NA .0806 NA .0555 0 1 .15
UI-eligible non-claimants
-1.629 NA .0537 NA .0369 0 1 .10in high-wage sector
-1.654 NA .0268 NA .0184 0 1 .05
Notes: See Table 1A.
Table 4B
Change per 100,000 in Employment under a Temporary Wage Subsidy,
Sensitivity Analysis with s= .014
Non-Dislocated Workers
High-wage Low-wage
Dislocated UI-eligible UI-eligible UI-eligible
Model and Assumptions workers claimants claimants non-claimants UI-ineligibles Total h k d
Single Labor Market 1243 -277 -415 -264 -277 -1233 .5 .75 .176
1238 -275 -421 -259 -275 -1230 .4 .75 .118
1232 -280 -409 -258 -280 -1227 .3 .75 .076
1228 -272 -408- -272 -272 -1224 .2 .75 .044
1223 -271 -407 -271 -271 -1220 .1 .75 .020
Dual Labor Market, with 1172 NA -492 -321 -341 -1154 0 .75 .15
UI-eligibIe non-claimants
1188 NA -511 -325 - -341- -1177 0 .75 .10
-
in low-wage sector
1203 NA -504 -347 -347 -1198 0 .75 .05
Dual Labor Market, with 1120 NA -665 NA - -432 -1097 0 1 .15
UI-eligible non-claimants
1138 NA -681 NA -442 -1123 0 1 .10in high-wage sector
1156 NA -696 NA -452 -1148 0 1 .05
c
Notes: See Table lA.
Table 5A
Effects of a Temporary Wage Subsidy on Expected Duration of Unemployment,
Sensitivity Analysis with T= 95
High-wage Low-wage
Dislocated VI-eligible VI-eligible VI-eligible
Model and Assumptions workers claimants claimants non-claimants VI-ineligibles h k d
Single Labor Market -2.077 .0404 .0647 .0380 .0461 .5 .75 .176
-2.061 .0315 .0504 .0297 .0359 .4 .75 .118
-2.046 .0231 .0366 .0218 .0262 .3 .75 .076
-2.031 .0149 .0235 .0137 .0168 .2 .75 .044
-2.015 .0074 .0116 ~OO67 .0083 .1 .75 .020
Dual Labor Market, with -1.915 NA .0948 .0559 .0677 0 .75 .15
VI-eligible non-:claimants
-1.944 NA .0631 .0370 .0451 0 .75 .10in low-wage sector
-1.977 NA .0315 .0'181 .0225 0 .75 .05
Dual Labor Market, with -1.797 NA .1127 NA .0805 0 1 .15
VI-eligible non-claimants
-1.832 NA .0749 NA .0536 0 1 .10in high-wage sector
-1.866 NA .0372 NA .0269 0 1 .05
Notes: See Table 1A.
Change per 100,000 in Employment under a Temporary Wage Subsidy,
Sensitivity Analysis with T= 95
Non-Dislocated Workers
High-wage Low-wage
Model and Dislocated UI-eligible UI-eligible UI-eligible
Assumptions workers claimants claimants non-claimants UI-ineligibles Total h k d
Single Labor Market 1038 -218 -359 -207 -250 -1034 .5 .75 .176
1030 -219 -356 -205 -246 -1026 .4 .75 .118
1023 -227 -359 -208 -246 -1040 .3 .75 .076
1015 -225 -338 -197 -253 -1013 .2 .75 .044
1008 -224 -336 -224 -224 -1008 .1 . .75 .020
Dual Labor Market, 957 NA -414 -242 -294 -950 0 .75 .15
with VI-eligible
971 NA -418 -248 -300 -966 0 .75 .10non-claimants in ldw-
wage sector 986 NA -437 -246 -301 -984 0 .75 .05
Dual Labor Market, 898 NA -517 NA -372 -889 0 1 .15
with VI-eligible
915 NA -531 NA -377 -908 0 1 .10non-claimants in high-
wage sector 933 NA -536 NA -395 -931 0 1 .05
Notes: See Table lA.
Table 6A
Effects ofa Temporary Wage Subsidy on Expected Duration of Unemployment,
Sensitivity Analysis with T=97.5
High-wage Low-wage
Dislocated UI-eligible UI-eligible UI-eligible
Model and Assumptions workers claimants claimants non-claimants UI-in~ligibles h k d
Single Labor Market -1.877 .0302 .0459 .0287 .0319 .5 .75 .176
-1.867 .0237 .0360 .0226 .0250 .4 .75 .118
-1.858 .0174 .0263 .0168 .0183 .3 .75 .076
-1.849 .0112 . .0169 .0105 .0118 .2 .75 .044
-1.840 .0056 .0084 .0059 .0059 .1 .75- .020
Dual Labor Market, with -1.769 NA .0689 .0433 .0480 0 .75 .15
UI-eligible non-claimants
-1.790 NA .0458 .0288 .0319 0 .75 .10in low-wage sector
-1.811 NA .0229 .0144 .0159 0 .75 .05
Dual Labor Market, with -1.688 NA .0832 NA .0580 0 1 .15
UI-eligible non-claimants
-1.713 NA .0553 NA .0386 0 1 .10in high-wage sector
-1.739 NA .0276 NA .0193 0 1 .05
Notes: See Table 1A.
Table 6B
Change per 100,000 in Employment under a Temporary Wage Subsidy,
Sensitivity Analysis with T=97.5
Non-Dislocated Workers
High-wage Low-wage
Dislocated VI-eligible VI-eligible VI-eligible
Model and Assumptions workers claimants claimants non-claimants VI-ineligibles Total h k d
Single Labor Market 937 -206 -310 -193 -219 -928 .5 .75 .176
933 -199 -314 -199 -215 -927 .4 .75 .118
928 -203 -315 -203 -203 -924 .3 .75 .076
924 -205 -307 -205 -205 -922 .2 .75 .044
920 -212 -283 -212 -212 -919 .1 .75 .020
Dual Labor Market, with 883 NA -373 -238 ' -259 -870 0 .75 .15
VI-eligible non-claimants
894 NA -379 -237 -269 -885 0 .75 .10in low-wage sector
905 NA -400 -233 -267 -900 0 .75 .05
Dual Labor Market, with 842 NA -486 NA -339 -825 0 1 .15
V I-eligibIe non-claimants
855 NA -499 NA -344 -843 0 1 .10in high-wage sector
869 NA -503 NA -360 -863 0 1 .05






Effects of a $500 Reemployment Bonus on Expected Duration of Unemployment,
Reference Case
High-wage Low-wage
Dislocated VI~eligible VI-eligible VI-eligible
Model and Assumptions Workers claimants claimants non-claimants VI-ineligibles h k d
I
Single Labor Market -0.894 .0157 .0248 .0145 .0174 .5 .75 .176
-0.903 .0125 .0199 .0119 .0138 .4 .75 .118
-0.913 .0093 .0145 .0087 .0102 .3 .75 .076
-0.921 .0061 .0094 .0064 .0067 .2 .75 .044
-0.930 .0031 .0048 .0028 .0034 .1 .75 .020
Dual Labor Market, with -0.898 NA .0392 .0238 .0277 0 .75 .15
UI-eligible non-claimants
-0.912 NA .0261 .0156 .0185 0 .75 .10in low-wage sector
-0.925 NA .0131 .0075 .0923 0 .75 .05
Dual Labor Market, with -0.903 NA .0498 NA .0327 0 1 .15
UI-eligible non-claimants
-0.920 NA .0332 NA .0235 0 1 .10in high-wage sector
-0.937 NA .0166 NA .0117 0 1 .05
Notes: The reemployment bonus modelled is one in which a lump sum of $500 is paid to a dislocated worker who finds a new job within 12 weeks and
holds the job for 4 months.
Results shown are for the reference case in which the biweekly separation rate s= .010, total jobs available T=96.25, and the biweekly interest
rate r= .008. Hence, the results in this table should be compared with the wage subsidy impacts shown in Table 1A.
h denotes the fraction of VI-eligible claimants who are high-wage workers; k denotes the VI take-up rate; and d denotes the fraction of low-wage
VI-eligible claimants who are dislocated workers. In the single labor market model, d=3h/[17(1-h)], as shown in the text. In the dual labor
market models, d and k are independent.
Table 7B




Dislocated VI-eligible VI-eligible VI-eligible
Model and Assumptions Workers claimants claimants non-claimants VI-ineligibles Total h k d
Single Labor Market 447 -93 -152 -93 -105 -443 .5 .75 .176
452 -93 -155 -93 -109 -450 .4 .75 .118
456 -103 -145 -103 -103 -454 .3 .75 .076
461 -99 -164 -99 -99 -461 .2 .75 .044
465 -133 -133 -133 -66 -465 .1 .75 .020
l
Dual Labor Market, with 449 NA -193 -116 -135 -444 0 .75 .15
UI-eligible non-claimants
455 NA -196 -120 -135 -451 0 .75 .10in low-wage sector
462 NA -201 -115 -144 -460 0 .75 .05
Dual Labor Market, with 451 NA -262 NA -181 -443 0 1 .15
UI-eligible non-claimants
460 NA -267 NA -188 -455 0 1 .10in high-wage sector
468 NA -279 NA -186 -465 0 1 .05
Notes: See Table 7A. The results in this table should be compared with the wage subsidy results in Table lB.
